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Abstract
This article critically evaluates what we call the ‘popular narrative’ about the state of the public
sphere. We identify three elements of this popular narrative (the post-truth element, the polari-
sation element and the new technology element), and draw on philosophical work on hinge epis-
temology and social roles to challenge each one. We propose, instead, that public debate has
always depended on non-evidential commitments, that it has always been home to significant,
deep division, and that social media, rather than causing these phenomena, has just made them
more visible. Finally, we recommend some changes to traditional and social media which we
believe would help foster a healthier, more inclusive, public sphere.
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The popular post-truth narrative
THERE HAS BEEN a lot of discussion about
changes to contemporary public debate, and
the dawning of what’s been called a ‘post-
truth era’. Much of this discussion fits with
the following popular narrative: that we’re liv-
ing in a post-truth era, where many members
of the public no longer respect facts and evi-
dence, and instead respond to emotional, dog-
matic claims that reinforce their existing
beliefs. Society is becoming more polarised as
these non-evidential influences pull members
of the public away from a common, centre
ground, towards extreme far right and far left
positions. This is caused, or at least worsened,
by an unregulated social media which lack the
rigorous empirical standards of traditional
(broadcast and print) news, and which allow
misinformation to run rampant, whilst echo
chambers reinforce pre-existing beliefs and fil-
ter out conflicting evidence.
We discuss, and challenge, three elements of
this popular narrative which we believe are
more complicated than this narrative suggests:
• Post-truth element: there is a loss of respect
for facts and evidence in the public sphere.
• Polarisation element: the public sphere is
becoming increasingly divided.
• New technology element: these changes have
been caused (or significantly exacerbated)
by social media.
The first two outline purported changes to the
arena of contemporary public debate, whilst
the third points to a cause of them. We argue
that the changes referenced in the first two
elements are to some extent overblown and
that social media have instead, rather than
causing these changes, revealed aspects of the
public sphere that were there all along. We
think the following three claims paint a more
comprehensive picture:
• Non-evidential commitments: debates in the
public sphere, like all debates, require some
biases, values, and other commitments
which cannot be supported by evidence.
• Pre-existing diversity: the public sphere has
always contained significant (albeit unac-
knowledged and sometimes unexpressed)
division.
• Media responsibility: one of social media’s
most significant effects on the public sphere
has been to reveal its pre-existing nature.
In order to do this, we will first need to intro-
duce a view called hinge epistemology, that
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shows the importance of non-evidential com-
mitments (or ‘hinges’) to ourmost basic episte-
mic practices. We then argue that hinges are
crucial for other epistemic practices, including
public debate. This will undermine the post-
truth element of the popular narrative. Next,
we argue that public debate has always
involved a variety of different social roles and
social locations, each with their own hinges.
This will undermine the polarisation element
of the popular narrative. Finally, we clarify
the way that social media have affected the
public sphere, throwing some doubt on
the new technology element of the popular
narrative, and make some recommendations




era of human history as being ‘post-truth’—
where this means that public debate is based on,
or appeals to, non-evidential considerations—
because our belief-formation practices have
always rested on non-evidential foundations.
Aviewcalledhinge epistemology canhelpmake
this clear.
Hinge epistemology arose in response to the
problems thrown up by radical sceptical scenar-
ios.Thesearescenarioswhichcall allourknowl-
edge into question in one go. A classic example
points out that, in spite of your current percep-
tions to the contrary, you might be a disembo-
died brain suspended in a vat of green liquid,
with all your apparent experiences being
prompted by well-placed electrodes. Or, per-
haps you are a butterfly dreaming that it is
human, or you are a human plugged into a
hyper-realistic computer simulation.
However unlikely you think such scenarios
are, you cannot rule them out—at least not by
appealing to evidence, because any evidence
that you might draw upon (about the capabil-
ities of current science, or the architecture of a
butterfly’s brain) is called into question by
the scenario itself. No one is suggesting these
scenarios are actually true; the power of radi-
cal sceptical scenarios is that their mere possi-
bility appears to undermine almost all of our
knowledge. If we cannot rule out that we’re
disembodied brains in vats, then it seems we
cannot know anything incompatible with that
scenario either: even something as simple as
that we have two hands. Even if the scenario
isn’t true and things are just as they appear,
we can’t know that they are.
In response, hinge epistemologists have
argued that the practice of doubting has simi-
lar rules to the practice of belief: both need to
be supported by stronger evidence than them-
selves in order to be taken seriously. Imagine a
restaurateur is trying to convince you that
their establishment is the most popular in the
city. You are more likely to be persuaded by
reviews on an independent website than by a
sign in the restaurant’s window, because the
reviews offer further, and more compelling,
evidence, and the sign does not. Similarly, if I
tried to make you doubt that a close friend is
trustworthy, you would expect me to have
grounds for doubt that were more certain than
the doubt itself. You would expect me to have
proof of a concrete betrayal, rather than a gen-
eral feeling of distrust. The very general, hypo-
thetical worry that ‘you could be a brain in a
vat’ is not evidentially grounded—there is
nothing I can point to which makes it seem
likely, or even plausible—and so, hinge episte-
mologists say, it should not shake your confi-
dence in your everyday beliefs.
If hinge epistemologists are right, then some
claims—such as ‘I am not a brain in a vat’ and
‘my perceptual faculties are broadly reliable’—
have an unusual epistemic status. They cannot
be supported by evidence, but they cannot be
doubted with evidence either. No matter how
hard and long you look for evidence for—or
against—the claim that you are not a brain in a
vat, you will not find any. These claims do not
respond to evidence in the usual way: they
are too close to the foundations of our beliefs.
But, precisely because they are so close to the
foundations of our beliefs, they are absolutely
necessary to our epistemic practices. We can-
not believe or doubt any other claims about
the external world unless these non-
evidential claims are in place. So, while it is
perhaps not quite right to say we believe these
non-evidential claims, hinge epistemologists
say that we legitimately accept, or are commit-
ted to, them. And we can therefore justifiably
believe other claims which rest on them—
such as the claim that we have hands.
The term ‘hinge epistemology’ was chosen
because of this unusual status. It comes from
an analogy Wittgenstein used: he said claims
like these are the ‘hinges’ which must stay
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put if we want the door to turn.1 Non-
evidential commitments like these are essen-
tial to our everyday belief-forming practices,
because our ability to navigate the world
hinges on them.
Hinge commitments in public
debate
The lesson of hinge epistemology is that our
most basic epistemic practices are dependent
on unquestionable commitments that cannot
be supported by evidence. It has been argued
that the same general point applies to other, less
basic epistemic practices too.2 Whenever we
conduct an inquiry—whether a formal one like
a scientific investigation, or a more informal
one like a conversation with a friend—some
things need to be taken as read in order for that
inquiry to proceed.
We always need the basic, anti-sceptical hinge
commitments, regardless ofwhat inquirywe are
carrying out. But there are other, local hinge
commitments, that are necessary for our every-
day inquiries. We broadly assume the informa-
tion we get from others is reliable unless we
have a specific reason not to. The reason we do
this is not (just) because we are kind-hearted
and charitable; it is epistemically necessary. If
youwere to doubt the information you got from
others without a specific reason, you would not
be able to conduct even the most mundane epi-
stemic inquiries; you could not ask for direc-
tions, follow an instruction manual, or have a
basic conversation about the weather.
There are also hingesweneed in order to carry
out inquiries within ‘the public sphere’. This is
the namewe give to the spaces in which citizens
of a democracy deliberate about which policies
and parties they, as a society, want to be gov-
erned by. Historically, this meant gathering in a
physical space, like a public square. Now it typ-
ically means views reported in print and broad-
cast news and, more recently, on social media.
Such deliberations are a kind of epistemic
inquiry too. They are where citizens formulate
beliefs on important issues such as how to
respond to climate change, andwhat proportion
of social resources to invest in education.And so,
there are commitments citizens need to accept
for the inquiry to proceed. For example, perhaps
the following commitment is necessary for suc-
cessful participation in the public sphere: other
citizens have valuable knowledge to contribute,
and Imay need to adjust my beliefs accordingly.
Such commitments are like general background
principles which have to be accepted for demo-
cratic deliberation to proceed. Whilst we may
sometimes have evidence for (or doubts about)
them, when we are participating in the practice
of democratic deliberation, they are comparable
to the anti-sceptical hinges discussed above: they
have to stand fast—even if we have no evidence
for them at all—because the process of inquiry
hinges on them. They are essential to navigating
the world as a citizen.
If this is correct, some non-evidential com-
mitments have always been part of the public
sphere; successful democratic debate could not
proceed without them. Characterising any par-
ticular era of debate as ‘post-truth’ (where this
means ‘involving appeals to non-evidential
commitments’) is unhelpful. It suggests that lim-
iting ourselves to facts and evidence will
improve the quality and the outcomes of public
debate, when in fact public debate hinges on cer-
tain non-evidential commitments.
Before moving on we want to highlight an
important distinction between non-evidential
commitments, and anti-evidential commit-
ments. When we describe hinge commitments
as non-evidential, we are saying they have a
very particular relationship with evidence—
they cannot be supported or doubted whilst
inquiry is underway. They may be responsive
to evidence outside the given inquiry, butwithin
the inquiry they must be bracketed. Falsehoods
and lies are not bracketed fromevidence-respon-
siveness. When Sean Spicer—acting as then
PresidentDonald Trump’s press secretary—said
that the crowd at the National Mall was ‘the
largest audience to ever witness an inaugura-
tion’, that wasn’t a principle of inquiry that
needed to be held fast for deliberation to con-
tinue. It could, within the debate at hand, be
doubted or (if it weren’t false) supported by evi-
dence. And in fact, Spicer attempted to support
it with evidence at the time, citing—incorrect—
figures of how many trips were made on the
DC Metro.
1L. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, London, HarperCol-
lins, [1969] 1972.
2M.Williams,Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Real-
ism and the Basis of Scepticism, Princeton NJ, Prince-
ton University Press, 1996. A. Coliva, Extended
Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology. London, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015.
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Anti-evidential claims, like falsehoods and
lies, do not lie beyond the scope of our eviden-
tial practices as hinge commitments do; they
simply contravene them. Endorsing the accep-
tance of hinge commitments does not mean
endorsing falsehoods, and if an increase in
falsehoods was what people meant when they
say ‘post-truth’we would be inclined to agree
with them. But we do not think that is all that
people mean when they talk about living in a
post-truth era, because (a) falsehoods and lies
have always been a significant problem in the
public sphere, and (b) it would be naïve to sug-
gest that they are caused by a lack of respect
for evidence, rather than plain ignorance and
wilful self-interest.
Social roles and polarisation
Re-evaluating the post-truth element of the
popular narrative, as we have done above, will
have ramifications for the polarisation element,
too. The polarisation element says that non-
evidential commitments have undermined the
single, unified common ground the public once
shared, and pushed us towards two extreme
poles. If hinge epistemology is correct that our
epistemic practices have always hinged on non-
evidential commitments, then it seems strange
toblamethemforanymovement (towardspoles
or elsewhere). Non-evidential commitments
may be part of the story, in the same way that a
room full of drypaper is relevant to the explana-
tion ofwhy afire starts. But ifwewant to under-
stand why the public sphere looks different, we
should be searching for something new—the
equivalent of an open flame—not factors that
have been present all along.
We will not argue for a particular explanation
of polarisation here (though we are tempted by
explanations in terms of worsening material
inequality, the broadening of the gap between
rich and poor, and increased awareness of this
gap). Instead,ourgoal inthissectionistoquestion
whether polarisation has actually taken place to
theextent, and in theway, that thepopularnarra-
tive presumes. The popular narrative describes
polarisation as amovement away froma unified
common ground, but we question whether such
a common ground ever existed.
In the previous sectionwe said that inquiries
in the public sphere hinge on non-evidential
commitments. If everyone shared the same
commitments, then the popular narrative’s
assumption—that we all, at some point,
shared a unified common ground—would
make sense. But the real world is messier than
this. None of us are merely citizens. We all
have other social roles—such as parent, child,
teacher, doctor—and we all occupy one of a
wide variety of social locations—such as able-
bodied, working class, white woman—which
come with their own epistemic commitments
too.3 For example, we might say the role of a
doctor hinges on commitments such as the fol-
lowing: the diagnosis which is statistically
most common, given my patient’s symptoms
and history, is the correct one.
Just as participating in democratic delibera-
tion requires an openness to revise one’s
beliefs in light of one’s fellow citizens’ argu-
ments, similarly, carrying out inquiries and
navigating the world as a doctor requires reli-
able, but fallible, heuristics like this. It enables
doctors, in the vast majority of cases, to pre-
scribe the right treatment, whilst still being
able to distribute finite resources (for example,
time and local testing capabilities) between
many patients. And doubting it would mean
stepping outside the role of a doctor. But, per-
haps the patient’s parent is not entitled to that
commitment. Perhaps their role determines
that they should reserve judgement and keep
a close eye on their child for new or worsening
symptoms. Although the doctor and the par-
ent accept different commitments here, it does
not seem like either of them arewrong. It is just
that navigating the world as a doctor and nav-
igating the world as a parent require different
commitments.
In addition to various social roles, we each
also occupy a particular social location which
offers yet more hinges. Think of the male
employers in the 1960s and early 1970s who
unthinkingly accepted something like the fol-
lowing: making comments about female
employees’ bodies is just a bit of fun. This com-
mitment facilitated their navigation of the
world as men. It helped them to maintain a
feeling of dominance and security at a time
3S. Wright, ‘Virtues, social roles, and contextual-
ism’, Metaphilosophy, vol. 41, nos. 1–2, 2010, pp. 95–
114; https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.
01629.x (accessed 28 June 2021). N. A. Ashton,
‘Appropriate belief without evidence’, Teorema:
International Journal of Philosophy, no. 2, 2015,
pp. 7–28.
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when women—who had only achieved the
vote within living memory—were entering
the workforce in greater numbers. Of course,
that commitment was harder for women on
the receiving end of such comments to accept,
as it was an obstacle to forming coherent
understandings of their experiences: if these
comments were ‘a bit of fun’ then why did they
make themdeeply uncomfortable?Viewed from
outside the male employers’ social location, this
commitment seemed dubious and was (fairly
successfully) challenged. Multiple women in
the US—particularly black women with experi-
ence of the civil rightsmovement—brought legal
cases against their (white) male employers, and
the concept of sexual harassment has now been
enshrined in law in 122 countries. As the com-
mitment to understanding lewd comments as
‘a bit of fun’ accrued legal and social costs, it
became increasingly unhelpful for navigating
the world as a male employer, until it (largely)
lost its status as a hinge.
In this section we have shown that the public
sphere is, and always has been, pluralistic.4
Although democratic deliberation requires us to
meet as citizens with a shared commitment to
updating our beliefs in response to each other,
our other social roles require us to bring addi-
tional hinges to the table too, and these often con-
flict. We’ve also hinted at how non-evidential
commitments can be questioned, and even suc-
cessfully changed, from outside—an advisory
board might question and update the commit-
ments of a doctor in light of new evidence, for
example, and social and legal progress canmake
material changeswhichaffectwhethera commit-
ment helps navigate theworld.
Social media’s impact on the public
sphere
The third element of the popular narrative is
that social media are (at least partly) to blame
for two big changes that have taken place in
the public sphere. In the previous sections we
questioned the popular narrative regarding
these changes, and in this section we challenge
the popular narrative about their cause.
For a long time, traditional media were the
dominant forums for democratic deliberation.
Print and broadcast news outlets collect and
share information relevant to their readers’
interests and, in doing so, they highlight social
problems, prompt conversations about how to
address them, and elicit responses from the
relevant governing bodies. Let’s say a library
in a small village is only open on weekday
mornings. A local journalist might ask mem-
bers of the community what they think about
this, discover—and then write an article
reporting—that the opening hours are a bar-
rier to access, and in doing so, prompt a con-
versation which pressures the local council to
assign more funding so the library’s hours
can be extended.
According to the common narrative, social
media diverted attention away from this tradi-
tional forum, and prompted a downward spiral
of reduced funding, lower quality reporting,
declining interest and trust, and shrinking circu-
lation (which then prompts the next round of the
spiral). Whilst this is true, it is important to also
recognise the other factors in play. Many papers
were, and remain, vulnerable to syndicalisation
and centralisation owing to private ownership.5
Their owners were willing to chase profits and
page clicks at the expense of local democracy.6
At the same time, the UK government has
reduced the financial support it gives the BBC.7
The journalist who would have spent a couple
4Compare J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia
NY, Columbia University Press, 2005 on the ‘fact
of reasonable pluralism’.
5E. J. Limb, ‘The future of local journalism lies in
community ownership’, Tribune, 12 July 2020;
https://tribunemag.co.uk/2020/07/the-future-of-
local-journalism-lies-in-community-ownership
(accessed 28 June 2021).
6T. Bagshaw, ‘What happens when our local news
disappears? How UK local newspapers are closing
and coverage of court proceedings is not happen-
ing’, Index on Censorship, vol. 48, no. 1, 2019;
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/03
06422019842090 (accessed 28 June 2021).
7‘Television licence fee to be frozen for next six years’,
BBC News, 20 October 2010; https://www.bbc.com/
news/entertainment-arts-11572171; J. Martinson and
J. Plunkett, ‘George Osborne forces BBC to pay for
over-75s’ TV licences’, The Guardian, 6 July 2015;
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/jul/06/
osborne-slashes-bbc-budget-pay-over-75s-tv-licences;
A. Barker, ‘BBC faces era of cuts after reporting “sub-
stantial shortfall”’, Financial Times, 15 September
2020; https://www.ft.com/content/d8e1911e-6233-
4f2a-bc0b-7dfd97f9ff55 (all accessed 28 June 2021).
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of days ‘in the field’ interviewing community
members about the local library a few years
ago might now have just a few hours to source
quotes from—and perhaps build entire stories
around—social media posts. But this is not
solely the fault of socialmedia—themore funda-
mental threat to democracy is concentrated pri-
vate ownership and political austerity.
Something else which can be attributed
more squarely to social media—and the inter-
net generally—is increased awareness of the
diversity that exists in the public sphere. Tradi-
tional media were historically aimed at just a
small subset of the public. They catered to, and
reflected the views of, property owning white
men, who were both the only people who could
vote (until 1918) and the people most likely to
makepurchasingdecisions for theirhousehold.
Whilst mainstream media outlets have made
efforts to diversify their offerings over the
decades, this has oftenmeant creating separate,
dedicated programming (such as the BBC’s
Woman’s Hour, running since 1946). More
recent efforts to make substantial changes to
broadcasting and journalistic practices them-
selves (such as those championed by Media
Diversified, founded in 2013) have made pro-
gress, but are far from complete. As such, until
recently traditional media still gave—and per-
haps the overwhelmingly white, middle class
people working in it still had—the impression
of abroadlyunifiedpublic sphere. Socialmedia
have helped dispel this myth, as now any citi-
zen with a mobile phone can connect with
like-minded people, and voice their (collective)
interests for themselves. It has become much
easier toarticulate andbroadcastourownopin-
ions and, if they resonatewithothers, theyhave
the potential to reach thousands or even mil-
lionsofpeople. Issuesno longerhave to capture
the attention of editors and journalists in order
to become ‘news’.
This has created the impression of a sudden
splintering of the public sphere, but the diver-
sity of opinion and interests was always there.
They were just not as visible to some people
before social media reduced the barriers to
contributing to the public sphere. Similarly,
social media have made dependence on non-
evidential commitments more apparent. One’s
own commitments are difficult to spot if they
are shared by the majority of people one
encounters. And even if we meet someone
who does not share them, we may pay more
attention to the commitments they have that
we do not share. In such a case, their commit-
ments strike us as particularly novel and
unreasonable, and create the impression that
the other person or group is uniquely willing
to accept non-evidential commitments, in con-
trast to our, supposedly undiluted, respect for
evidence and facts.
If this is correct, thena renewed focuson facts
and evidencewill not help us improve the pub-
lic sphere; that idea isbasedonseeking toreturn
to aunifiedcommonground that never existed.
Instead, we need to work towards a pluralistic
public sphere which accepts and embraces a
diversity of roles, experiences and values. This
will likely involve some shared fundamental
commitments—such as the citizen hinge we
suggested above—in recognition of each
other’s ‘common humanity’ as contributors to
the public sphere.8 But it will differ sharply
from a return to a narrow public sphere in
which differences are hidden or denied.
Recommendations for a healthy
public sphere
Having undermined the popular narrative
and its suggestions for improving the health
of the public sphere, we now make some brief
alternative recommendations for fostering a
public sphere that recognises—and works
with—the plurality of the public sphere, rather
than attempting, vainly, to constrain it. We
start with recommendations for traditional
media, before offering some constructive
thoughts on social media.
Traditional media
In the previous section we outlined several
challenges that traditional media currently
face. Many of these require practical and regu-
latory changes which are outside the scope of
our expertise, for example, decentralising and
decommercialising ownership and/or increas-
ing arms’ length government funding for a
diverse range of media outlets.9 But there is
8R. Gaita, A Common Humanity, Abingdon,
Routledge, 2002.
9N. Fenton, D. Freedman, J. Schlosberg and
L. Dencik, The Media Manifesto, Cambridge,
Polity, 2020.
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also important theoretical work to be done on
the social role of the journalist, whose widely
accepted role within a democratic society is
to voice public concerns and hold power to
account, but whose hinge commitments often
hold them back from doing this.
We argued above that some of journalism’s
basic practices stem fromahistorical assumption
of a single, broadly unified ‘public’ comprising
male ‘heads of households’. Of course, this is a
simplified view and there has always been some
diversity of media outlets. But we believe the
assumption that there is a fundamentally unified
‘public’hascontributedtothetraditionalmedia’s
current vulnerability. In light of this, thosework-
ingintraditionalmediashouldacknowledgethat
the taskofarticulatingtheconcernsof ‘thepublic’
is more complicated than it was once thought to
be. This means bringing attention and clarity to
apluralityofviewpointswhichdifferat theirvery
foundations. Social media have made these dif-
ferent viewpoints much easier to find, so merely
gathering and reporting on them is no longer a
unique journalistic skill. But understanding and
appreciating viewpoints that clash with our
own,andinterpretingandfacilitatingassessment
of them, ismuchmore difficult. If the journalist’s
role is to facilitate democratic deliberation, this is
the area they now need to focus on. This could
mean a revitalised version of ‘local’ correspon-
dents who are properly embedded—not just in
different regional areas, but in different commu-
nities of shared social roles and locations, and
who are therefore able to understand and articu-
late their interests in a way that even those with
different fundamental commitments can relate
to. Social media provide a (flawed) forum for
different groups to communicate and learn from
one another, so if journalists are to compete they
need to find ways to foster genuine, productive
interaction.
Relatedly, we think the journalist’s commit-
ment to impartiality needs to be reconsidered,
and we recognise that there is current lively
debate on this issue.10 It iswidely accepted that
journalists should not use their role to advance
personal interests, and that navigating the
world as a journalist hinges on some level of
impartiality. But this commitment is inter-
preted more strongly in some media outlets
thanothers. In some cases, it goes as far aswith-
holding from any expression of social or politi-
cal investment whatsoever. For example, the
BBC recently reprimanded its presenter Naga
Munchetty (in a decision later overturned
owing to public pressure) for expressing the
view that a particular expression used by then
President Donald Trump had, when said to
her in other contexts, been racist.
Such a commitment to impartiality seems to
be in tension with holding power to account.
Think again about the library example above.
The journalist in that case picked a side to advo-
cate for. If shehadmaintainedstrict impartiality,
her article may not have exerted the same pres-
sure on the council and led to the library’s hours
being changed. Most real life issues are more
complicated than this (as they often involve dif-
ferentandatleastsuperficiallycompetingpublic
interests), sopartiality requires careful consider-
ation. But, we endorse current conversations
about whether there can be a sophisticated ver-
sion of partiality that is better suited to holding
power toaccount than impartiality—and, there-
fore,whether it has a place amongst the journal-
ist’s hinge commitments.
Social media
Unlike traditionalmedia,most socialmedia plat-
forms were not built with democratic public
deliberation in mind. Facebook originated as a
student directory and its usage was initially lim-
ited to students of certain universities, before
expanding out to other universities and schools.
But now, it clearly is a space of public delibera-
tion: it has evolved into a global discussion plat-
form and is the primary source of news and
information for a significant proportion of
adults.11So,weurgentlyneedaclearunderstand-
ing of theway these platforms shape the deliber-
ation that they host.
Given the need to respect the plurality of the
publicsphere,weshouldthinkparticularlyabout
the extent to which different platforms enable
interaction between people with different social
roles and backgrounds. For example, on Twitter
it is possible—and very common—to ‘follow’
people who you don’t know in real life, and
10L. RavenWallace, The View From Somewhere: Undo-
ing the Myth of Journalistic Objectivity, Chicago IL,
Chicago University Press, 2019.
11‘Usage of social media as a news source world-
wide as of February 2020’, Statista; https://www.
statista.com/statistics/718019/social-media-news-
source/ (accessed 28 June 2021).
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who may be very different from anyone you do
know in many politically and socially salient
ways.Facebook,ontheotherhand,wasdesigned
primarily with existing relationships—friends,
familyandcolleagues—inmind.Twitter exposes
people to newpoints of view—something that
is crucial for a healthy, pluralistic public
sphere—whilst Facebook allows relatively
intimate, private conversations, which can
be conducive to processing and evaluating
new ideas.Ahealthy pluralistic public sphere
will likely require both these elements, and so
we need to think carefully about what the
ideal balance between them would be, and
how to achieve this in our online spaces.12
We should also think carefully about how
both existing and new social roles interact
with social media environments. We have
argued that social roles have their own hinge
commitments. We have also suggested that
certain traditional roles—journalist, politician,
citizen—have been central to the division of
labour constitutive of modern democratic
deliberation. Consider how platforms handled
one such existing social role, the presidency:
many major platforms suspended Donald
Trump for violating their terms of service—as
they would any other user—whilst others took
extraordinary steps to remove or obscure con-
tent he posted because of the significance of
his social role. In both cases, these steps were
only taken as he approached the end of his pres-
idency. What steps is it appropriate to take
against a world leader who violates a plat-
form’s terms of service? Should there be special
rules for those who have a lot of power?13 Are
there any contexts in which a world leader can
be considered to be acting as merely a private
citizen?
Relatedly, we should think carefully about
the new social roles that social media have
given rise to. Should we think of social media
influencers—users with a large following who
sometimes get paid to promote products and
services to their audiences—as entertainers, or
as freelance advertisers? And what about
unpaid individuals who find themselves
becoming spokespeople for the marginalised
groups they are part of? They are often labelled
as ‘activists’, butmany object to this characteri-
sation and maintain that they are merely citi-
zens voicing their interests in the public
sphere like anyone else. Is this right, or might
we consider them as embedded, invested
(albeit unpaid) journalists? If socialmedia rules
and regulation are to respect the distinctive
function of the social roles that enable demo-
cratic debate—as with the President of the
United States—it’s important to have a clear
understanding of the functions that new roles
play in the public sphere. Roles such as social
media influencer and ‘activist’ are currently
under-specifiedormisunderstood. These ques-
tions go beyond mere labels, since the way
someone’s role is understood affects its hinge
commitments, as well as affecting how the
role’s occupants are treated in important
ways—not least in the eyes of the law.
Concluding thoughts
We have argued, contrary to the popular nar-
rative, for the following claims: democratic
deliberation has always rested, unproblemati-
cally, on non-evidential commitments; the
public sphere has always been home to signif-
icant, deep division; and social media have
merely made these facts more apparent. We
also recommended some changes to tradi-
tional and social media which could improve
the health of the public sphere. Although we
have framed our suggestions in opposition to
the popular narrative, they are not particularly
radical. The driving thought behind theories of
the public sphere has always been that good
epistemic outcomes and autonomous collec-
tive democratic choices come from interactions
between different perspectives. Our proposals,
whilst differing on the details, are still true to
this picture.
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